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Abstract. In this paper we introduce a neural network model of self-organization.
This model uses a variation of Hebb rule for updating its synaptic weights, and surely
converges to the equilibrium status. The key point of the convergence is the update rule
that constrains the total synaptic weight and this seems to make the model stable. We
investigate the role of the constraint and show that it is the constraint that makes the
model stable. For analyzing this setting, we propose a simple probabilistic game that
models the neural network and the self-organization process. Then, we investigate the
characteristics of this game, namely, the probability that the game becomes stable and
the number of the steps it takes.
1. Introduction
How does the brain establish connections between neurons? This question has been
one of the important issues in Neuroscience, and theoretical researchers have proposed
various models for self-organization mechanisms of the brain. In many of these models,
competitive learning, or more specifically, competitive variants of Hebb’s rule have been
used as a key principle. In this paper, we study one property of such competitive Hebb
rules.
As one typical example of self-organization, “orientation selectivity” [WH63] has been
studied intensively. In the primary visual cortex (area17) of cats, there is some group of
neurons that strongly reacts to the presentation of light bars of a certain orientation,
which we call orientation selectivity. An interesting point is that in a very early stage
after birth, every neuron reacts to all bars of every orientation. This indicates that
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orientation selectivity is obtained after birth; that is, each neuron selects one preferred
orientation among all orientations. To explain the development of orientation selectivity,
a considerable number of mathematical models have been investigated; see, e.g., [Swi96].
Although these models may look quite different, most of them use, as a principal rule for
modifying synaptic strength, a competitive variant of Hebb rule, which is essentially the
same as the rule proposed in the pioneer paper of von der Malsburg [Mal73], the paper
that first gave a mathematical model for the development of orientation selectivity.
A Hebb rule is a simple rule for updating, e.g., the weight of connection between two
neurons. The rule just says that the connection between two neurons is strengthened
if they both become active simultaneously. This rule has been used widely for neural
network learning. Von der Malsburg constrained this updating rule so that the total
connection weight of one neuron are kept under some bound. In this paper, we call this
variation of Hebb rule a constrained Hebb rule. He showed through computer experiments
that orientation selectivity is surely developed with his constrained Hebb rule.
Since the work of von der Malsburg, many models have been proposed, and some have
been theoretically analyzed in depth; see, e.g., [Tan90]. For example, a feature of various
constrained Hebb rules as a learning mechanism has been discussed in [MM94]. Yet, the
question of why orientation selectivity is obtained by following a constrained Hebb rule
has not been addressed. Note that the development of orientation selectivity is different
from ordinary learning in the sense that a neuron (or, a group of neurons) establishes
a preference to one particular orientation from given (more or less) uniformly random
orientation stimuli. In this paper, we discuss why and how one feature from equally good
features is selected with a constrained Hebb rule.
In order to simplify our analysis, we propose a simple probabilistic game called “mo-
nopolist game” for abstracting Hebb rules. In monopolist game, an updating rule cor-
responds to game’s rule, and the selectivity is interpreted as that a single winner of a
game — monopolist — emerges. Then we prove that a monopolist emerges with prob-
ability one in games following a von der Malsburg type rule. On the other hand, we
showed theoretical evidence supporting that (i) the chance of having a monopolist is low
without any constraint, and (ii) a monopolist emerges even under a rule with a weaker
constraint. These results indicates that the importance of constraint in Hebb rules (or,
more generally, competition in learning) to select one feature from equally good features.
We also analyzed how fast the monopolist emerges in games following a von der
Malsburg type rule. This analysis can be used, in future, to estimate the convergence speed
of constrained Hebb rules. (In this paper, most of the proofs are given in Appendix.)
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2. Von der Malsburg’s Model and Monopolist Game
Here we first explain briefly the model considered by von der Malsburg. (Von der Malsburg
studied the selectivity for a set of neurons, but here we only consider its basic component.)
Neural Network Structure
We consider two layer neural network. In particular, we discuss here the orientation
selectivity for one neuron, and thus, we assume that there is only one output cell. On the
other hand, the input layer consists of 19 input cells that are (supposed to be) arranged
in a hexagon like the ones in Figure 1. We use i for indicating the ith input cell, and IN
for the set of all input cells.
Stimuli and Firing Rule
We use 9 stimuli with different orientations (Figure 2), which are given to the network
randomly. Here • indicates an input cell that gets input 1, and ◦ indicates an input cell
that gets input 0.
output
inputs
Figure 1: Neural network model.
Figure 2: Nine stimuli.
We use ai to denote input value (either 0 or 1) to the ith input cell. Then output
value V is computed as V = Thp (
∑
i∈IN wiai), where wi is the current synaptic strength
between the output cell and the ith input cell. Thp(x) is a threshold function that gives
x− p if x > p and 0 otherwise, where p is given as a parameter.
Updating Rule
Initially, each weight wi is set to some random number between 0 to some constant. Then
weights are updated each time according to the following variation of Hebb’s rule, which
we call the constrained Hebb rule (of von der Malsburg).
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w′i = wi + cincaiV, and wi = w
′
i ×
W0/∑
k∈I
w′k
 .
Where cinc (which is called a growth rate) and W0 (total weight bound) are constants given
as parameters. The first formula may be considered as the original Hebb’s rule; on the
other hand, the second one is introduced in order to keep the total weight within W0. (In
fact, it is kept as W0.)
With this setting, von der Malsburg demonstrated that the selectivity is developed
through computer simulations. Thus, it seems likely that some selection occurs even
from uniformly random examples, and that the constraint of the von der Malsburg’s rule
is a key for such a selection. In this paper we would like to study this feature of the
constrained Hebb rule. For this, we further simplify von der Malsburg’s computation
model, and propose the following simple probabilistic game.
Monopolist Game
Basic Rule: Consider a finite number of players. Initially they are given the same
amount of money. The game goes step by step, and at each step, one of the players
wins with the same probability. The winner gets some amount of money, while the
other loses some.
Details: A player who loses all his money is said become bankrupt. Once a player
becomes bankrupt, he cannot get any amount of money, though he can still win with
the same probability. (See below for the motivation.)
Goal: The game terminates if all but one player become bankrupt. If the survived
player keeps enough money at that point, then he is called a monopolist. We call a
situation where a monopolist appears monopoly.
Notations. We use n and n′ to denote the number of players and that of remaining (not
being bankrupt) players, and use i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, to denote players’ indices. Throughout
this paper, each player’s wealth is simply called a weight, and let wi denote the player i’s
current weight. Let I and W0 respectively denote the initial weight of each player and
the total amount of initial weights; that is, W0 = nI.
The connection of this game with von der Malsburg’s computation model is clear; each
player’s weight corresponds to total synaptic strength between the output cell and a set
of input cells corresponding to one type of stimulus, and the emergence of a monopolist
means that the network develops preference to one orientation. From this correspondence,
it is natural to require that even a bankrupt player can win with the same probability
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1/n, which reflects the fact that the probability of a stimulus of each orientation appears
is the same no matter how neural connections are organized.
An updating rule of players’ weights corresponds to a rule of changing synaptic
strength in the network. Here we can state updating rules in the following way. (In
the following, let i0 denote the player who wins at the current step.)
wi =
 wi + finc − fdec, if i = i0, andwi − fdec, otherwise.
Here finc and fdec are the amount of increment and decrement at each step respectively,
and one type of monopolist game is specified by defining finc and fdec. In the following,
we assume that these values are determined from wi, wi0 , n, and n
′. From the relation
to von der Malsburg’s computation model, we require that both finc and fdec are 0 if
wi = 0; that is, once a player loses all money, he stays forever in the 0 weight state. (In
the following, we will omit stating this requirement explicitly.)
Now we consider the rule that corresponds to the constrained Hebb rule of von der
Malsburg’s rule. It is defined as follows with constant cinc.
finc = cinc, and fdec = cinc/n
′. (1)
(Recall that n′ is the number of currently remaining players.)
Note that with this rule, the total amount of wealth is kept constant. Thus, in this
sense, it corresponds to von der Malsburg’s rule, and we call it constrained rule. Note that
we may also consider a similar rule such that finc is not constant but proportional to wi.
(Similarly, fdec is also proportional to wi.) This rule might be closer to the original von der
Malsburg’s rule. This difference is, however, not essential for discussing the probability
of having a monopolist, i.e., for our discussion in Section 3. On the other hand, there is a
significant difference in convergence speed; but roughly speaking, the difference disappears
if we take the log of weight. Thus, we will discuss with the above simpler rule.
3. Importance of Competition
Here we compare three different updating rules for monopolist game, and show that
constraint is important to derive a monopolist. From this, we could infer that some sort
of constraint, (or, competition in more general) is important in learning rules for selecting
one among the others through random process.
In the following, we consider the following three updating rules: (1) constrained rule,
(2) local rule, and (3) semi local rule. Below we define these rules (except (1) that has
been defined in the previous section) and discuss the probability P∗ that a monopolist
emerges.
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Constrained Rule
We show that under constrained rule, P∗ is 1, that is, a monopolist emerges with proba-
bility 1.
A monopolist game in general expressed by an one-dimensional random walk. More
precisely, for any i, we can express the player i’s wealth wi as the following random walk.
0w
incfdecf
0 Wi
Figure 3: One-dimensional random walk.
Note that the particle (i.e., the weight wi) moves to the left (resp., to the right) with
probability 1 − 1/n (resp., 1/n). The left (resp., right) end of the interval means that
the player i becomes bankrupt (resp., a monopolist). Thus, these two ends are absorbing
walls.
In a monopolist game under constrained rule with n = 2, we have finc = cinc/2 and
fdec = cinc/2. Hence, the above random walk becomes standard one (see, e.g., [Fel68]),
and it is well-known that the particle in such a standard random walk goes to one of the
absorbing walls in finite steps with probability 1. This proves that P∗ = 1 when n = 2.
Then by induction, we can prove P∗ = 1 when n > 2; thus, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Under constrained rule, a monopolist emerges (in finite steps) with prob-
ability 1.
Local Rule
In constrained rule, for computing fdec, we need the number of remaining players; that
is, weights cannot be updated locally. In general, in order to be competitive, an updating
rule must not be local. Thus, to see the importance of competition, we consider here the
following purely local updating rule.
finc = cinc, and fdec = cdec. (2)
Notice that for this local rule (and the next semi local rule), the notion of monopolist
is less clear than constrained rule, because the notion of “enough amount of money” is
not clear. Here we simply consider it as W0/2, a half of the total initial weight. That is,
we regard a single surviver as a monopolist if his weight is more than W0/2; hence, P∗
is the probability that the game reaches to the state where wi1 ≥ W0/2 for some i1 and
wi = 0 for the other i.
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We first discuss one feature of this updating rule. In the following, let us fix cdec = 1.
Our computer experiments show that the probability to have a single surviver (in a
reasonable amount of steps) drops rapidly when cinc ≥ n + 1. The reason is clear from
the following fact.
Theorem 3.2. Fix cdec to be one, and consider one player’s weight. For any t, it increases,
by t
(cinc
n
− 1
)
on average, after t steps.
Thus, if cinc > n, then it is quite likely that all players increase their weights, and
thus no bankrupt appears in the game. On the other hand, if cinc < n, then every player
dies quickly, and hence, no monopolist occurs even though someone may become the last
player. This means that the most crucial case is the case cinc = n. Next we discuss P∗ for
such a case.
Recall that P∗ is the probability that, at some point in the game, all but one become
bankrupt and that the survived player has weight ≥W0/2. Since it is difficult to estimate
P∗ directly, we analyze the following probability P
′
∗ instead of P∗: P
′
∗ is the probability that
at least one player’s weight reaches to W0/2 and no more two players have weight larger
than sufficiently large value, say, kW0 for some k > 0. Notice that if a monopolist emerges
at some point, then clearly, someone needs to reach W0/2 in the game. Furthermore, it
is unlikely that two players reach to kW0 and one of them become bankrupt afterwards.
Thus, we may regard P ′∗ as an upper bound of P∗. For this P
′
∗, we have the following
bound.
Theorem 3.3. For any W1 and sufficiently large W2, we have
P ′∗ <
(
1−
I
W2 + n
)n
+
nI
W2
(
1−
I
W2 + n
)n−1
−
(
1−
I
W1
)n
.
For example, by taking W1 and W2 as
nI
2
and knI respectively, we have
P ′∗ < e
−I/(kI+1) + e−I(n−1)/(kI+1)n/k − e−2 ≈ (1 + 1/k)e−1/k − e−2,
which is less than 0.6 if k = 1. On the other hand, our computer experiments show that
P∗ is less than 0.5 for various sets of parameters.
Semi Local Rule
As a third updating rule, we consider somewhat mixture of the above two rules. It keeps a
certain amount of locality, but it still has some constraint. This rule is defined as follows.
finc = min(cinc,W0 −
∑
j
wj), and fdec = cdec. (3)
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That is, we want to keep the total weight smaller than W0, where W0 is the total initial
weight. Thus, a winner can gain cinc (in net, cinc − cdec) if there is some room to increase
its weight. In this case, only the winner needs to know the current total weight, or the
amount of room to the limit W0, and the other players can update its weight locally.
Our computer experiments show that the probability P∗ that a monopolist emerges
is fairly large if cinc is large enough, say cinc ≥ 2n. On the other hand, P∗ gets small when
cinc is small, which is explained in the same way as local rule. Although we have not been
able to prove that P∗ is large for sufficiently large cinc, we can give some analytical result
supporting it.
Here instead of analyzing P∗, we estimate (i) the average number of steps until all but
one players become bankrupt, and (ii) the average number of steps until the total weight
(which is initially W0) becomes W0/2. Let Tn→1 and TW0→W0/2 denote the former and the
latter numbers respectively. We prove below that Tn→1 is smaller than TW0→W0/2 if W0
is large enough. This means that it is likely that at the time when all but one players
become bankrupt, the total weight, which is the same as the survivor’s weight, is larger
than W0/2, that is, the surviver is a monopolist.
Theorem 3.4. Fix again cdec to be one. If I ≥ (ln 6)n(n − 2) and cinc ≥ 2n, then we
have TW0→W0/2 > Tn→1.
4. Efficiency Analysis
In this section we discuss how fast a monopolist emerges in games with constrained
rule. We estimate an upper bound on the average number of steps needed for monopoly
to emerge, and we give some justification (not a rigorous proof) supporting that it is
O(n2(In/cinc)
2).
We start with some definitions and notations that are used through the section. Here
we modify our monopolist game and define a variant of monopolist game. Let game0
denote the original monopolist game. We will denote by game1 a variant of game0 in
which no bankrupt player can win. Thus, in game1, the winning probability of remaining
players is 1/n′ instead of 1/n. As we will see game1 is useful for induction and it is easier
to analyze.
These two game types are defined on different probability spaces. Let us define them
more precisely. For all two game types, (the execution of) a game is specified by a
game sequence, i.e., a string from {1, . . . , n}∗ that defines a history of winners. (Precisely
speaking, we also need to consider infinite strings; but as we see below, we may ignore
infinite strings.) We say that a game sequence x kills a player i if wi becomes 0 (or,
negative) in the game following x just after the end of x, and we say that x derives a
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monopolist if the second last player is killed and monopoly emerges just after x. We say
that a game sequence x is valid (resp., strongly valid) if it derives a monopolist and no
prefix of it derives a monopolist (resp., x contains no indices of previously killed players).
Note that the meaning of these notions may vary depending on game types. Now for any
n, let Xn (resp., Yn) be the set of game sequences for n player games that are strongly
valid w.r.t. game0 (resp., valid w.r.t. game1). For each x in Xn, its probability Pr{x} is
n−|x|. On the other hand, the probability P˜r{y} of y ∈ Yn depends on the number of
remaining players, and it is rather complicated. (We omit specifying P˜r{y} because it
is not important for our discussion.) Note that Xn and Yn are all prefix free. Also it is
not hard to show that Pr{Xn} and P˜r{Yn} are one. (For example, Pr{Xn} = 1 follows
from Theorem 3.1.) Therefore, we may regard Xn and Yn as a probability space of the
corresponding game, and we do not have to worry about infinite strings.
We denote by T (n, I1, . . . , In) (resp., T1(n, I1, . . . , In)) the number of steps needed un-
til monopoly emerges in game0 (resp, game1) with n players and initial weight I1, . . . , In.
When all the weights are equal, we use the simpler notation T (n, I). Our goal is to
get some upper bound on E[T (n, I)]. But instead, we will analyze an upper bound on
E[T1(n, I)], which gives us an upper bound on E[T (n, I)], as the following lemma guaran-
tees. (The proof is intuitively clear and it is omitted in this abstract.)
Lemma 4.1. There exists c1 such that for any sufficiently large n and any I, we have
E[T (n, I)] ≤ c1nE[T1(n, I)].
Now we analyze the convergence speed of game1. For our analysis, we split a game
execution into stages where each stage is a part of the game until some amount of play-
ers become bankrupt. More specifically, we denote by t1(n, I1, . . . , In) the number of
steps needed in a game with n players and initial weights I1, . . . , In until at least 1
player becomes bankrupt. The following lemma relates the two terms T1(n, I1, . . . , In)
and t1(n, I1, . . . , In).
Lemma 4.2. For any n and I1, . . . , In, there exists a constant c2, c2 ≥ 1, and weights
I ′1, . . . , I
′
n−c2 such that the following inequality holds.
E[T1(n, I1, . . . , In)] ≤ E[t1(n, I1, . . . , In)] + E[T1(n− c2, I
′
1, . . . , I
′
n−c2)].
By this lemma we can use induction for bounding the expected value of T1. Recall that
when analyzing t1(n, I1, . . . , In), by the way it is defined, no player becomes bankrupt,
and thus, the amount of decrement is fixed to cinc/n. Thus, game1 until at least one player
becomes bankrupt is regarded as a n-dimensional random walk, which is much easier to
analyze. In fact, we can use the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.3. Let X be a random variable that is 1 with probability 1/n and 0 with
probability 1−1/n, and let S = X1+ . . .+Xt, the sum of the outcomes of t random trials
of X . Then, for some constant α > 0, the following holds for any t and n.
Pr
S ≤ tn − α
√
t
n
 > 1/3.
Now we are now ready to make the following claim1.
Claim.
E[T (n, I)] = O
(
n2
(
In
cinc
)2)
.
Justification. We start with estimating E[t1(n, I1, . . . , In)] by using the above lemma.
For a given t and for any i, Let ti be the number of times that player i wins within t
steps. Then wi, the weight of player i, in game1 is expressed as follows.
wi = Ii + cincti − cdect ≤ Ii + cinc
(
ti −
t
n
)
.
(For simplifying our notation, we use c to denote cinc in the following.)
Moreover, since game1 until at least one player becomes bankrupt is regarded as a
n-dimensional random walk, we can use Lemma 4.3 to show that the following event
happens with probability bigger than 1/3.
wi = Ii + c
(
ti −
t
n
)
≤ Ii + c
 t
n
− α
√
t
n
−
t
n
 = Ii − cα
√
t
n
.
Therefore, with probability more than 1/3, the weight of player i becomes zero or
negative if cα
√
t/n ≥ Ii, that is, t ≥ (Ii/cα)
2n. Now sort players by their initial weights,
and define P to be the set of the first (i.e., the smallest) n/2 players. Since the total
weight is W0 (at any step), all players in P have weight at most 2W0/n and therefore,
Pr{wi ≤ 0 in t0 = n
(
2W0
ncα
)2
steps | i ∈ P } >
1
3
.
Moreover, if we can assume that each player in P become bankrupt independently,
we also have the following probability:
Pr{There exists i ∈ P , such that wi < 0 in t0 steps } > 1−
(
2
3
)n/2
.
1We do not have a rigorous proof for this result, and for this reason we stated it as a claim.
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From this observation, it is reasonable to bound E[t2(n, I1, . . . , In)] by c3t0 for some
constant c3 since for most of the valid game sequences (a 1− (2/3)
n/2 fraction of them)
this bound holds.
Now combining the above lemmas and the obtained bound, we have
E[T1(n, I)] ≤ E[t1(n, I1, . . . , In)] + E[T1(n− c2, I
′
1, . . . , I
′
n−c2
)]
≤ c3n
(
2W0
ncα
)2
+ E[T1(n− c2, I
′
1, . . . , I
′
n−c2)]
≤ c3n
(
2W0
ncα
)2
+ c3(n− 1)
(
2W0
(n− 1)cα
)2
+ E[T1(n− c
′
2, I
′
1, . . . , I
′
n−c′2
)] · · ·
≤ c3n
(
W0
cα
)2
≤ c4n
(
In
c
)2
, for some constant c4.
From this and Lemma 4.1, we obtain the desired bound. ⊔⊓
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Appendix
Here we state the proofs of lemmas and theorems not stated in the body of the paper.
Section 3
We begin with Theorem 3.2. To prove it, we first estimate, the probability PI,W that
one player, say player 1, whose initial weight is I obtains weight W at some point in the
game. By using results in random work [Fel68], we can easily analyze this probability and
obtain the following bounds.
Fact 1. For any I and W , we have
I
W + n
≤ PI,W ≤
I
W
.
Theorem 3.2 Fix cdec to be one, and consider one player’s weight. For any t, it increases,
by t
(cinc
n
− 1
)
on average, after t steps.
Proof. Consider P ′∗ with W1 and sufficiently large W2. Note first that
Pr{less than two players’ weight reach to W2} = (1− PI,W2)
n + nPI,W2(1− PI,W2)
n−1
Pr{no player’s wealth reaches to W1} = (1− PI,W1)
n.
Then by definition of P ′∗, we have
P ′∗ = (1− PI,W2)
n + nPI,W2(1− PI,W2)
n−1 − (1− PI,W1)
n
<
(
1−
I
W2 + n
)n
+
nI
W2
(
1−
I
W2 + n
)n−1
−
(
1−
I
W1
)n
.
⊔⊓
Next we prove Theorem 3.4. In the following, we only consider games with semi local
rule specified in the theorem; that is, the game starts with n players, the bound is the
same as the total initial weight W0 = nI, and cinc ≥ 2n.
Below, for a given k ≤ n, we consider the situation that k players are left, and analyze
their total weight and the weight of the poorest player. For this, we use random walks
representing respectively, the total weight, a random walk for the total, and the weight
of currently the poorest player, a random walk for the poorest. These random walks are
expressed as follows.
1
inc
Cinc
W00
x
0 W0n
x
nn
1 k n
k
k k
11
1 k
1
C
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Figure 4: Random walk for the total (above) and for the poorest (below)
Since the total weight is at most W0, the poorest player cannot have more thanW0/k.
Also as soon as the poorest player obtains W0/k, he cannot be the poorest, and he (or,
his role) is replaced with some currently poorest player, whose weight is again less than
W0/k. In any case, if we only consider the weight of the poorest player, we can assume
that the rightmost end is a reflecting wall. On the other hand, by definition of semi local
rule, the rightmost end of a random walk for the total is a reflecting wall. Thus, in both
random walks, the rightmost walls are reflecting walls; hence, the particles are eventually
absorbed in the leftmost walls. Here we discuss the difference between the number of
steps until the particles are absorbed.
Theorem 3.4 Fix again cdec to be one. If I ≥ (ln 6)n(n − 2) and cinc ≥ 2n, then we
have TW0→W0/2 > Tn→1.
Proof. We first give an upper bound to Tn→1, the average number of steps until all but
one players become bankrupt. For any k ≤ n, consider the situation in the game that k
players are left, and let TP(k) be the average number of steps that some player becomes
bankrupt from this situation.
By Lemma A.1 below, we have
Tn→1 ≤
n∑
k=1
TP(k)
≤ n(eW0/2n + eW0/3n + . . .+ eW0/(n
2)) ≤ neW0/2n + n(n− 2)eW0/3n ≤ 2neW0/2,
where the last inequality holds from our assumption W0 ≥ n(n− 2) ln 6.
Next consider TW0→W0/2, the average number of steps needed until the total weight
becomes W0/2 from W0. Let TT(k, x, y) be the average number of steps until the total
weight becomes y from x under the condition that none of remaining k players become
bankrupt. Note first that for any k and k′ such that k < k′, we have TT(k, x, y) ≤
TT(k′, x, y). Then, for any x0, ..., xn−3, we have
TT(n,W0, x0) + TT(n− 1, x0, x1) + · · ·+ TT(2, xn−3,W0/2) ≥ TT(2,W0,W0/2).
Hence, TW0→W0/2 ≥ TT(2,W0,W0/2). On the other hand, TT(2,W0,W0/2) is bounded
in the following way by using Lemma A.2 below and the assumption that cinc ≥ 2n.
TT(2,W0,W0/2) >
n− 2
2
((
1 +
2
n− 2
)W0
2 − 1
)(
1− e−2
)
≥
n− 2
2
·
(
e
W0
2(n−2) (1− e−2)
)
≥
n− 2
3
· eW0/2(n−2).
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Comparing both bounds, we have TW0→W0/2 ≥ Tn→1 if W0 ≥ n(n− 2) ln 6. ⊔⊓
Lemma A.1. Consider the situation in the game that k players are left, and let TP(k)
be the average number of steps that some player becomes bankrupt from this situation.
Then we have TP(k) ≤ ne
W0
nk .
Proof. Consider a random walk for the poorest. As explained above, we may assume
that the random walk has a reflecting wall at W0/k and an absorbing wall at 0. Here
for showing an upper bound, we assume, as the worst case, that the initial weight of the
poorest is W0/k; that is, the random walk starts off at W0/k. Then TP(k) is bounded by
the average number of steps until the particle reaches to the absorbing wall at 0.
Let tx be the random variable denoting the number of steps starting off at x and
arriving at x− 1 for the first time. Then we can evaluate tx by
tx =
 1, with probability 1− 1/n, and1 + tx+cinc−1 + . . .+ tx+1 + tx, otherwise.
Define ex to be the expectation of tx. Then we have
ex =
n
n− 1
+
1
n− 1
(ex+cinc−1 + . . .+ ex+1).
Then by induction on x, we can show that eW0/k−x ≤ (1+1/(n−1))
x. Thus, we have
TP(k) ≤
W0/k−1∑
x=0
eW0/k−x ≤ (n− 1)
(
1 +
1
n− 1
)W0
k ≈ (n− 1)e
W0
nk .
⊔⊓
Lemma A.2. For any x and y, x > y, we have
TT(2, x, y) >
n− 2
2
((
1 +
2
n− 2
)W0−y
2 −
(
1 +
2
n− 2
)W0−x
2
)
(1− e−2).
Proof. Consider a random walk for the total (see Figure 4). By dividing all parameters
by k = 2, we can modify it to essentially the same random walks as Figure 5.
C
inc
W0
k
x
0 n1
k
n
k
11
k
C
Figure 5: A modification of a random walk for the total
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Note that this random walk is quite similar to a random walk for the poorest (see
Figure 4 below). Thus, for ex, the average number of steps starting off at x and arriving
at x − 1 for the first time, a similar argument derives that the following relation (here c
= cinc/2).
ex > 1 +
2
n− 2
(ex+c−1 + . . .+ ex+1).
Then it is not so hard to see that
eW0/2−x ≥
(
1 +
2
n− 2
)x
−
(
1 +
2
n− 2
)x−c+1
=
(
1 +
2
n− 2
)x(
1−
(
1 +
2
n− 2
)−c+1)
.
Now by using our assumption that c = cinc/2 ≥ n, we can derive the following bound.
TT(2, x, y) ≥
(W0−y)/2−1∑
x=(W0−x)/2
(
1 +
2
n− 2
)x(
1−
(
1 +
2
n− 2
)−c+1)
≥
n− 2
2
((
1 +
2
n− 2
)W0−y
2 −
(
1 +
2
n− 2
)W0−x
2
)
(1− e−2).
⊔⊓
Section 4
Lemma 4.2 For any n and I1, . . . , In, there exists a constant c2, c2 ≥ 1, and weights
I ′1, . . . , I
′
n−c2
such that the following inequality holds.
E[T1(n, I1, . . . , In)] ≤ E[t1(n, I1, . . . , In)] + E[T1(n− c2, I
′
1, . . . , I
′
n−c2
)].
Proof. Let Y ⊆ Yn be the set of all valid game sequences y such that the number of
players becomes strictly smaller than n for the first time just after y. By definition of
E[T1(n, I1, . . . , In)], we have the following equality.
E[T1(n, I1, . . . , In)] =
∑
x∈Yn
P˜r{x} · |x| =
∑
x∈Yn,y∈Y
x=yz
P˜r{yz}(|y|+ |z|).
Notice here that we can split P˜r{yz} in two factors, P˜r{y} and P˜ry{z}, where P˜ry{z}
determines the probability of z after the game follows y. Also note that the set Yy of
strongly valid z depends on y. Thus, we can rewrite the above expression as follows.
E[T1(n, I1, . . . , In)]
=
∑
y∈Y
∑
z∈Yz
P˜r{y}P˜ry{z} · |y|+
∑
y∈Y
∑
z∈Yz
P˜r{y}P˜ry{z} · |z|
=
∑
y∈Y
P˜r{y}|y|
 ∑
z∈Yz
P˜ry{z}+
∑
y∈Y
P˜r{y}
∑
z∈Yz
P˜ry{z} · |z|

= E[t1(n, I1, ..., In)]
∑
z∈Yz
P˜ry{z} +
∑
y∈Y
P˜r{y}E[T1(ny, Ii1(y), . . . , Iiny (y))]
≤ E[t1(n, I1, . . . , In)] + E[T1(n− c
′, I ′1, . . . , I
′
n−c′)].
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where the values of ny and Ii1(y), . . . , Iiny (y) are determined by the result of the
game following y. On the other hand, c′ and I ′i are chosen so that the value of
E[T1(ny, Ii1(y), . . . , Iiny (y))] is maximized. These values always exist since even if there
is an infinite number of game sequences y that appear on the summation, there is only a
finite number of possible values for ny (since ny must be between 1 and n− 1) and Iij(y)
(since
∑
j Iij(y) = In). ⊔⊓
Lemma 4.3. Let X be a random variable that is 1 with probability 1/n and 0 with
probability 1−1/n, and let S = X1+ . . .+Xt, the sum of the outcomes of t random trials
of X . Then, for some constant α > 0, the following holds for any t and n.
Pr
S ≤ tn − α
√
t
n
 > 1/3.
Proof. We estimate the probability that the statement of the lemma is false and show
that it is less than 2/3. That is, we upper bound the following probability.
Pr
S > tn − α
√
t
n
 = Pr
{
S >
t
n
}
+ Pr
 tn ≥ S > tn − α
√
t
n
 .
The first term in the sum is bounded by 1/2; see, e.g., [JS72]. Let s be the smallest
integer such that s > t/n− α
√
t/n. We calculate, by using Stirling’s approximation, the
second term of the above sum as follows.
Pr
 tn ≥ S > tn − α
√
t
n
 =
t/n∑
i=s
(
t
i
)(
1
n
)i (
1−
1
n
)t−i
=
t/n∑
i=s
(
t
i
)
(n− 1)t−i
nt
≤
t/n∑
i=s
√
t
2pii(t− i)
(
t
t− i
)t (t− i
i
)i (n− 1)t−i
nt
≤
t/n∑
i=s
√
t
2pii(t− i)
(
t(n− 1)
n(t− i)
)t (
t− i
i(n− 1)
)i
.
Also routine calculations show that
(
t(n−1)
n(t−i)
)t (
t−i
i(n−1)
)i
is always less than 1 for s ≤ i ≤
t/n and that this factor is maximized when i = t/n. From this by simple calculation, we
obatain the desired bound with α =
√
pi/12.
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